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ABSTRACT
Many challenges emerging from the current COVID-19 pandemic are behavioral in nature, 
which has prompted the field of behavioral design to propose solutions for issues as wide-
ranging as hand-washing, wearing masks, and the adoption of new norms for staying and 
working  from  home.  However,  on  the  whole  these  behavioral  interventions  have  been 
somewhat underwhelming, exposing an inherent brittleness that comes from three common 
“errors of projection” in current behavioral design methodology: projected stability, which 
fails  to  recognize  that  interventions  often  function  within  inherently  unstable  systems;  
projected persistence, which neglects to account for changes in those system conditions over 
time; and projected value, which assumes that definitions of success are universally shared 
across  contexts.  Borrowing  from  strategic  design  and  futures  thinking,  a  new  proposed 
strategic  foresight  model—behavioral  planning—allows  practitioners  to  better  address 
these  system-level,  anticipatory,  and  contextual  weaknesses  by  more  systematically 
identifying potential forces that may impact behavioral interventions before they have been 
implemented.  Behavioral  planning  will  help  designers  more  effectively  elicit  signals 
indicating the emergence of forces that may deform behavioral interventions in emergent  
COVID-19 contexts,  and promote “roughly  right”  directional solutions at  earlier stages in 
solution development to better address system shifts. 
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INTRODUCTION
As crises go, the COVID-19 pandemic is a natural fit for behavioral design, a field informed 
equally  by  psychology  and  economics  that  focuses  on  redirecting  “irrational”  behaviors 
through redesigned choice architecture and nudges. Indeed, coronavirus’ impact on personal 
and  professional  behavioral  norms  has  thrust  the  field  into  the  spotlight,  prompting 
behavioral experts to tackle handwashing, social distancing, mask-wearing, and shelter-in-
place  behaviors  (Lunn  et  al.,  2020)  to  contain  the  virus’  spread.  Yet  despite  the  clear  
applicability of behavioral insights, the collective results of these behavioral interventions 
have underwhelmed,  suggesting that  behavioral  solutions as  currently  conceived may be 
limited in their effectiveness. 
Typically,  behavioral  interventions  combine  findings  from  empirical  experiments  with 
knowledge about the target environment to deliver measurable behavioral change. But as 
COVID-19  has  amply  established,  contexts  are  frequently  dynamic  and  unstable,  even 
volatile,  and at  the mercy  of  internal  and external  stressors:  a  classic  “wicked  problem” 
(Rittel & Webber,  1973),  rather than the stable,  well-defined context in which behavioral 
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interventions  thrive.  As  a  result,  traditional  behavioral  approaches  may  inadvertently 
produce solutions that initially appear robust, but become fragile as conditions change or  
individuals adapt to new norms (Smith et al., 2009). Even when interventions achieve short-
term  success  they  may  quickly  become  brittle  when  conditions  change,  coming  at  the 
expense of greater resilience and longer-term impact (Sanders et al., 2018) and remaining 
perpetually  reactive  rather  than  proactive  in  their  positioning  and  tactical  rather  than 
strategic in their ultimate aims.
We suggest that a more generative, foresight-driven behavioral approach borrowing from 
strategic design—behavioral planning—can improve behavioral solutions to COVID-19 and 
similarly complex crises by solving for three common “errors of projection” that currently 
contribute to behavioral solution brittleness: projected stability, which fails to recognize that 
interventions  function  within  inherently  unstable  systems;  projected  persistence,  which 
neglects to account for changes in system conditions over time; and projected value, which 
assumes that definitions of success are universally shared across contexts.
1. ERRORS OF PROJECTION
1.1. The Error of Projected Stability: Solutions within Systems 
While COVID-19 has no shortage of  behavioral  issues to address,  it  is  also undeniably a  
systems challenge in which the ultimate goal—infection containment—requires a system-
level solution coordinating issues of public health, equity, and resource allocation. Behavioral 
design methodology typically focuses on achieving highly specified behavioral change, using 
findings derived from empirical experiments to inform behavioral interventions. While this 
may work in a stable system, life is not so simple; optimizing interventions for narrowly-
defined  behavioral  challenges  can  inadvertently  strip  out  too  much  important  ancillary  
system  information,  resulting  in  bounded  approaches  that  can’t  address  real  world  
complexity. In addition, experiments designed to achieve internal validity within lab confines 
may not necessarily prove externally valid in more complex real-world settings (Camerer,  
2011). 
A  second  result  of  this  narrow  focus  is  a  tendency  to  prioritize  tactical  efficiency  over 
system-level effectiveness, which means even successful behavioral interventions may miss  
the  mark  strategically  if  they  fail  to  contribute  to  system  outcomes.  “Opt-out”  organ 
donation,  long  used  as  an  exemplar  of  behavioral  design  success  (Johnson  &  Goldstein,  
2003),  provides a useful example. While making organ donation a default,  rather than an  
active choice, can increase the number of potential organ donors, recent studies recognize 
that declared consent achieves higher actual donations when family overrides of presumed 
consent  are  taken  into  account  (Lin  et  al.,  2018).  Narrowly  focusing  on  the  behavioral 
mechanism of consent also neglects that the presence of donor coordinators at hospitals can 
be an even stronger lever in promoting successful transplants (Sarlo et al., 2016), as well as 
other  factors  that  materially  impact  both  organ  donation  and  transplant  success  rates 
(Wojda et al.,  2017),  such as disparities in donation rates and organ waste across ethnic  
groups, or uneven demand for particular organs. 
The need to consider systems is critical to successfully addressing to COVID-19 challenges,  
both  in  obvious  system-level  tensions  between  shelter-in-place  directives  and  economic 
motives to open businesses but even in “simple” behaviors such as wearing masks. Even if  
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worn,  evidence  indicates  that  mask  effectiveness  relies  on  regular  use,  correct  fit,  and 
adherence to cleaning and replacement regimens, requiring solutions to overcome a wide  
range  of  individual  and  system-level  obstacles,  including  supply  and  demand,  visceral 
discomfort  (MacIntyre  et  al.,  2015),  implicit  political  associations (Pew Research  Center, 
2020),  and  identity  issues  (Sunstein,  2020)  that  may  stigmatize  essential  public  health 
recommendations. 
Finally, an overly narrow focus on behavioral change over system effects has implications on 
evaluation and what success looks like. Where systemic outcomes can be difficult to capture  
in  simple quantifiable  terms,  behavioral  change tends to  be highly  measurable,  and thus  
appealing as a marker of success even when behavioral change is not the best indicator of 
desired outcomes. This suggests that randomized control trials (RCTs), long considered the 
gold  standard  of  intervention  efficacy,  may  offer  false  precision,  potentially  valorizing 
measurability over actual impact (Deaton & Cartwright, 2018). 
1.2. The Error of Projected Persistence: Anticipatory Evidence
Resituating behavioral change interventions as elements in a system, rather than as isolated 
components, is necessary but insufficient in the face of the second error of projection: even 
the simplest of systems don’t stand still, demanding that we design not simply for today’s 
conditions  but  with  the  recognition  that  external  contexts  and  personal  conditions  are 
always  in  flux.  Considering  emergent  contexts  and  conditions,  or  the  impact  of  initial  
solutions on future states, is by no means a plea or expectation to predict the future. Rather,  
it  simply  suggests  the  value  of  designing  solutions  with  the  knowledge  that  change  is 
inevitable,  and that  solutions must  be considered as  components  of  continually  evolving 
systems. 
Failing  to  consider  the  dimension  of  time  can  have  significant  implications  in  a  swiftly  
evolving context such as COVID-19.  One such instance occurred when the U.S.  Center for  
Disease  Control  initially  did  not  recommend  that  the  general  population  wear  masks  in 
response  to  immediate  concerns  of  personal  protective  equipment  (PPE)  shortages,  
especially N-95 masks (Center for Disease Control, 2020). While this message addressed the  
immediate issue of supply and demand for N-95 masks, it also acted as a conceptual anchor  
by reducing peoples’  receptivity  to  subsequent  messaging that  masks  provided essential  
protection for everyone regardless  of their disease status (Garrett,  2020).  Taking a more 
longitudinal view can also help to surface important second-order effects from interventions.  
Studies  in  Rome,  Italy,  for  example,  suggest  that  further  research  on  shelter-in-place 
interventions face diminishing returns given their overall success and the increasingly more 
important need to address boredom and mental health issues that have surfaced as a result  
of prolonged periods of home-bound time (Barari et al., 2020). 
Applying  a  temporal  lens  to  behavioral  interventions  also  impacts  how  we  define  and 
evaluate success given that, almost by definition, solutions for future states that don’t yet  
exist  cannot  be  tested  using  traditional  evaluative  instruments.  Currently,  intervention 
efficacy  is  characterized  by  the  extent  to  which  we  can  achieve  short-term,  measurable  
behavioral change through evaluative mechanisms such as RCTs. While still useful and valid,  
the additional desire to measure progress toward larger system outcomes suggests a need to 
reframe  evaluative  testing  from  the  natural  conclusion  of  a  linear  process  to  feedback 
mechanisms within iterative ones that provide fodder for course-correction. 
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Taking an anticipatory stance toward COVID-19 interventions may therefore require looking  
beyond  traditional  lagging  metrics  such  as  mask-wearing,  numbers  of  infections,  and 
healthcare utilization to also embrace leading metrics such as increased group activity in 
nicer weather or shortages of disinfectant wipes that provide “weak signals” of emergent 
future states (Ansoff, 1975). Where lagging metrics look backwards, leading metrics provide 
directional indicators of near-future states (Fuerth, 2009),  demonstrating whether we are  
making progress toward the larger outcomes we seek before more traditional metrics are 
more  formally  employed,  and  allowing  practitioners  to  consider  potential  downstream 
issues or root causes at an earlier stage. 
1.3. The Error of Projected Values: Defining What’s “Normal’
Herbert Simon famously declared that designers convert current states into preferred ones  
(Simon, 1969). Conveniently ignored in this statement, however, is the underlying question 
“preferred for whom?” and its  close cousins,  “who defines what success looks like?”  and 
“who decides which problems deserve attention?” Many solutions to prominent COVID-19 
behavioral targets—handwashing, and increasing social distancing and working from home 
during  shelter-in-place  mandates—assume  access  to  resources  like  clean  water  (World 
Health  Organization,  2020),  WiFi,  and  the  ability  to  work  remotely  that  are  far  from 
universal. At best, these interventions reflect the limitations of choice architecture; at worst,  
they  reflect  norms  and  privilege  that  demonstrate  a  narrow  view  of  diverse  real-world 
contexts or even amplify existing system inequities, as seen in data indicating that Black and  
Brown groups are at higher overall medical risk, and also more likely to work in “essential”  
or service roles that can’t be executed from home (Bassett et al., 2020). 
Assumptions  of  easy  access  to  resources  belie  a  belief  in  the  existence  of  universal  
experiences  and  values.  When  interventions  ignore  the  broader  socio-economic  system 
context,  they  also  risk  dismissing the degree  to  which  community  or  legacy  perceptions 
impact personal behaviors, and where a legitimate lack of trust and credibility can contribute 
to brittle outcomes. Perceptions fed by news sources may impact peoples’ reluctance to seek 
medical treatment for COVID-like symptoms or other health care needs such as prenatal care 
(Li et al., 2020) due to the perceived contagiousness of hospitals or fear of overburdening  
medical  systems,  but  even  seemingly  non-controversial  health  messages  delivered  by 
experts  can  invite  skepticism  in  communities  with  a  historical  distrust  of  medical 
professionals (Meng et al., 2016). 
The  field’s  tendency  to  conflate  empirical  results  with  actual  applications  of  use  only 
exacerbates this effect. When researchers employ going to the gym as a proxy for improving 
personal health, for example, the use of this seemingly neutral surrogate activity can negate  
real-world issues of access, affordability, physical ability and identity that directly conflict  
with many individuals’  lived experience (Cohen et al.,  2016).  In the context of COVID-19, 
recommendations to wear masks ignore the nature of heterogeneous effects and the reality 
that Black men in the U.S. have a legitimate fear that donning face-coverings trade off one 
form of safety (public health) for another (racial profiling and assumptions of criminality) 
(Yancy, 2020). Solutions that address cognitive biases while neglecting the body they live in  
may fail to deliver desired outcomes, and expose fractures between experimental results and 
real life. When experiments, hypotheses, and notions of normal are defined by historically  
privileged ideals and populations, even the most rigorously conducted studies may conflict 
with the real-life contexts in which interventions play out. Participatory design, increasingly  
page 141
Schmidt, R. & Stenger, K. (2021). 
Behavioral planning: Improving 
behavioral design with “roughly 
right” foresight. Strategic Design 
Research Journal. Volume 14, 
number 01, January – April 2021. 
138-148. DOI: 
10.4013/sdrj.2021.141.12
used  in  the  context  of  design  activities  to  provide  power  and  a  voice  to  the  formerly  
excluded, can play a useful role to uncover and overturn these assumptions. 
2. A PROPOSED FORESIGHT MODEL: FORCES OF CHANGE
How, then, are we to address these errors of presumed stability, persistence, and values to 
design COVID solutions with systems, flux, and privilege in mind? We suggest that applying a  
scenario-based  foresight  lens  can  reduce  the  brittleness  of  behavioral  interventions:  By 
playing out the potential consequences of evolving conditions and the resultant system-level 
and individual adaptations to those shifts, we can design more flexible, or “plastic,” solutions 
with increased resilience. 
Applying  a  scenario-based sensibility  to  behavioral  design  may initially  seem misguided,  
given the field’s  traditionally  empirical,  evidence-based methodology.  But looking to data 
incorrectly presumes that we can always reason from precedent in a swiftly shifting context; 
instead, “roughly right” strategic speculation about probable, possible and plausible futures, 
with roots in scenario planning (Schwarz,  2009),  the futures cone (Voros,  2003),  Ansoff’s 
theory of weak signals (Ansoff, 1975) and Gaspard Berger’s theory of La Prospective (Berger  
et al., 1960), may be better positioned to provide both anticipatory and concretely actionable 
approaches to navigate complexity. 
Just  as  behavioral  economics  itself  emerged  in  reaction  to  economics’  overly  simple 
explanations  for  human  behavior  (Kahneman,  2011),  behavioral  planning  can  address 
behavioral  science’s  limitations  by  helping  us  speculate  on  how  the  presence  of  an 
intervention we’ve implemented will intervene in that system, and how the presence of other 
conditions  within  the  system  are  likely  to  deform  intervention  effectiveness.  The 
deformation of physical materials, which retain their structural integrity in the face of slight  
tensions but whose inherent fragility becomes evident when they encounter stronger forces, 
is an instructive analogy. Behavioral interventions may function perfectly well within stable  
environments, and only when subjected to acute or accumulated forces—such as contextual  
factors  or  other  system  incentives—is  their  brittleness  suddenly  exposed.  By  more 
proactively identifying the nature of these forces, and how they might derail interventions  
from their initial intent through behavioral planning, we can better build in resilience and 
feedback systems to identify potential breakdowns or challenges before they occur. 
Identifying  these  forces  requires  a  systematic  approach,  which  allows  us  to  explore  and 
express potential tensions in a structured way. To do this, we propose the use of a forces  
model (Figure 1) that consists of quadrants created by bisecting two dimensions in tension,  
where the intervention at the center acts and is acted upon in equal measure, disrupting the 
system simply by being present and serving as a nexus for behavioral planning.
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Figure 1. Intervention forces model.
The horizontal dimension depicts the tensions between contrasting conditions within which  
interventions are situated, with human-imposed, top-down, conditions—rules, policies, and 
directives with the express intent to cause behavioral change or the adoption of new norms
—on one side, and more organic, naturally emergent conditions on the other. In a COVID-19  
context, for example, the former might take the form of governmental orders, organizational  
requests to wear masks on-premises, or other forms of guidance from official sources.  In  
contrast, the latter set is composed of more organically occurring conditions or societal shifts  
that are less engineered than synergistic, and coalesce without official decree or centralized 
organization: the international, grassroots response to Black Lives Matter, seasonal ebbs and 
flows, or even the emergence of the coronavirus itself. This dimension can help us consider 
interventions in the context of systems, addressing our error of projected stability. 
The  second  (vertical)  tension  considers  adaptation,  pitting  ecosystem-level  responses  to 
interventions against individual adaptations that may occur as a result.  Where ecosystem  
adaptation captures the collisions or conversations between and amongst system elements 
that result in changes to system-level contexts—such as the impact of AirBnB™ on the hotel  
industry  and  individual  rental  markets—individual  adaptation  occurs  at  the  level  of 
individual people or entities as they adjust to new normals, resist interventions in acts of  
reactance, or develop second-order behaviors as a direct result of interventions. Here we can 
address  our  error  of  projected  values  by  considering  how  personal  and  ecosystem 
adaptations might reflect choices due to individual user contexts. Finally, in envisioning how 
these conditions and adaptations collectively yield four aspects of potential future scenarios 
that could arise from these forces acting on interventions, we can tackle our final error: that  
of projected persistence, and the knowledge that things change. 
In each quadrant, however, the presence of forces is not to be construed as a negative; forces  
can create additional stress on interventions, but can also reinforce or bolster their intent. In  
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the same way that social norms to dissuade drunk driving carry more weight when coupled  
with financial and legal penalties for DUIs, social norms for mask-wearing that are reinforced 
with  tangible  punitive  measures,  such  as  denial  of  shopping  privileges  at  stores  with 
mandatory mask policies, may boost usage (Politis et al, 2013). Whether positive or negative,  
identifying these potential  forces and implications can help us increase our sensitivity to  
early or weak signals of potential system change. While behavioral interventions cannot—
and should not be expected to—alleviate all these issues, recognizing where they exist can 
contribute to more future-facing, system-oriented solutions that are informed by the values  
of its participants. We examine each quadrant in more detail below.
2.1. How Might Other Policies or Incentives Impact Interventions?
Some emergent conditions can be characterized by ecosystem-level interactions between 
human-imposed  forces  and  potential  new  interventions  that  cause  solutions  to  function 
differently  than  they  might  have  been  expected  to  in  isolation.  For  example,  behavioral 
interventions  that  were  successful  in  encouraging  farmers  to  adopt  a  new water-saving 
farming approach in the water-scarce Colorado River Basin failed in their ultimate goal—to  
decrease the total amount of water used—when they conflicted with “use-it-or-lose-it” water 
policies  (UCRC  Staff  &  Wilson  Water  Group,  2018).  COVID-19’s  complexity,  diversity  of 
stakeholder perspectives,  and rapidly shifting context supplies numerous examples in the 
form of hand-washing or mask-wearing “nudges” that are alternately augmented or stymied 
by conflicting messages and directives from federal governments, health care organizations, 
and individual businesses. 
Just  as  behavioral  interventions are  impacted by other incentives  and policies,  they also 
exert their own influence on the ecosystem of persuasive elements. This can occur even in 
simple  systems  as  “substitution  effects”  when  automatic  payment  nudges  inadvertently 
offset  other  forms of  debt  reduction  (Adams et  al.,  2018).  But  reconsidering  issues that 
typically  sit  outside  of  behavioral  inquiry—such  as  how interventions  are  influenced by 
other system elements, or measuring contributions to system outcomes rather than as ends 
in  themselves—may  be  even  more  critical  in  complex  contexts  like  COVID-19  where 
progress toward larger system goals may suffer even when interventions work as planned.
2.2. How Are The Boundaries of The Problem Itself Changing?
In other cases, interventions can be shaped or deformed by organically occurring system-
level forces that arise when the nature of problem space itself naturally evolves. When shifts 
become sufficiently significant, they can render interventions irrelevant: For example, while 
the  Save  More  for  Tomorrow™  program  has  historically  used  opt-out  and  auto-escalate 
nudges  to  successfully  encourage  long-term  financial  investment  in  401ks  (Thaler  & 
Benartzi,  2004),  it  may prove  increasingly  brittle  as  the cohort  of  gig  economy workers 
without 401ks grows. 
In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic,  some naturally  emergent shifts may occur less in 
direct response to the changing disease state than to ancillary behaviors, such as working 
from  home.  Recent  studies  already  suggest  that  the  pandemic’s  combination  of  closed 
schools  and work-from-home is  contributing  to  significant  disparities  between male  and 
female research publication productivity in a world where women bear the brunt of family 
caretaking (Viglione, 2020). As a result, a generation of women is likely to lose professional 
page 144
Schmidt, R. & Stenger, K. (2021). 
Behavioral planning: Improving 
behavioral design with “roughly 
right” foresight. Strategic Design 
Research Journal. Volume 14, 
number 01, January – April 2021. 
138-148. DOI: 
10.4013/sdrj.2021.141.12
ground even as their male counterparts maintain a normal publishing rate, with potentially  
significant and long-term implications for future tenure and promotion decisions. 
2.3. What Second-order Issues Might We Need To Proactively 
Consider?
The third type of displacement occurs when individuals personally adapt to top-down forces 
and  interventions.  This  can  be  useful  when  habit  formation  sticks  beyond  its  original 
prompts,  but  can  also  lead to  more  perverse outcomes  as  in  the  “cobra  effect”  (Siebert, 
2001): Faced with a city overrun by cobras, Delhi officials introduced a reward for turning in  
captured snakes, inadvertently incenting a new market in snake breeding that increased its  
slithery population rather than decreasing it. 
Even when initially successful, behavioral interventions can wane in efficacy as individuals 
adapt. Suggestions to sing 20 seconds of favorite songs to ensure sufficiently rigorous hand 
washing may lose its novelty, resulting in waning motivation (Damgaard & Gravert, 2018) 
and adopting desirable behaviors like mask-wearing may perversely increase the likelihood 
that individuals feel protected enough to act on other risky behaviors (Nettle et al, 2012). But 
the second-order  effects  of  interventions can also take graver  turns.  While  stay-at-home 
orders to combat the spread of COVID-19 have been widely successful  and gained broad 
citizen  support  to  combat  the  public  health  emergency,  for  example,  new  evidence  also 
suggests  a  corresponding  increase  in  mental  health  issues  (Barari  et  al.,  2020)  and 
escalations in child abuse and domestic violence (Bradbury-Jones & Isham, 2020).
2.4. What Situational Factors Might Impact How Interventions Are 
Acted Upon?
Finally,  naturally  occurring conditions and situational  factors can also shape how people  
respond to  interventions.  New Year’s  resolutions  supply  a  familiar  example of  attaching 
habit formation to an otherwise arbitrary day of the year, but it’s also been shown that organ 
donation  peaks  in  the  summer  due  to  a  heightened level  of  risky  activities  that  lead  to 
accidents  and  brain  death  (Kamalia  et  al.,  2019).  When  cyclical  forces  are  known  and 
predictable, we can craft solutions aimed at preempting nonadherent behaviors, rather than  
reacting to them once they have occurred.  In the case of COVID-19, for example,  we can 
anticipate that nicer weather,  which makes congregating more tempting and masks more 
uncomfortable, will contribute to violations of social distancing and mask-wearing. Proactive 
approaches make a difference: While the mass Black Lives Matter gatherings in summer  
2020  could  have  contributed  to  additional  COVID  infections  spikes,  current  evidence 
indicates that this did not occur in large part because the events took place outside and  
protestors took precautions.
3. FORCES AS FORESIGHT
Given the short wavelength on which the COVID-19 pandemic continues to evolve, failing to 
apply foresight mechanisms such as behavioral planning risks being short-sighted and non-
strategic,  and  destined  to  result  in  reactive  solutions.  However,  the  call  for  increased 
foresight  also  has  methodological  and  conceptual  implications  that  challenge  some  of  
behavioral  design’s  fundamental  assumptions,  re-centering  what  we  design  for,  how  we 
define desired outcomes, and how to measure success.
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The  quantitative  evidence-based  processes  typically  used  in  behavioral  design,  such  as  
empirical  experimental  data  and  randomized  controlled  trials,  are  designed  to  deliver 
confidence in solutions. But treating past data as evidence of future success, and evaluation 
as an end-point rather than input for further refinement, also presumes that the past is all we 
need to design for the future, and that proof of efficacy will stand the test of time and across 
contexts. Scientific rigor can come at a cost: conducted under controlled environments and 
pithed of real-world context,  these findings tend to capture “average” measures,  and are  
more likely to prove the success of individual experiments than the applicability of those  
findings to actual settings. In other words, where empirical data allows us to design more  
precisely for what we know, it is less helpful when we need to construct solutions for what 
we don’t yet know. 
Optimizing for the known risks dooming behavioral design to continually tinker with tactical 
solutions  at  the  margins,  keeping  us  from  considering  speculative  and  “roughly  right”  
hypotheses  that  expand  our  sense  of  what  could  be  to  address  emergent  factors  more 
successfully (Schmidt, 2020). Achieving longitudinal, systems-level success may require the 
field of behavioral design to augment confidence in quantifiable, measurable evidence with 
other, more qualitative inputs, and require that practitioners develop a new level of comfort  
with being directionally,  rather than precisely, right. Where foresight tools like the forces 
model and the use of leading measures cannot deliver certainty, they do provide new lenses 
of plausibility and legitimacy, contributing to better hypotheses and correcting for errors of  
presumed stability, persistence, and shared values that have too long gone unquestioned.
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